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used to account for the two-step decision process. The paper also analyses how German 
firm decisions were affected by the liberalisation of FDI regulations in India. Results show 
remarkable differences between the selection and the ownership share equation, and also 
between the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The evidence clearly reveals the trade-
offs involved in selective FDI approvals and foreign ownership restrictions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Attracting  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  is  a  high  priority  among  governments  in 
developing (and developed) countries. The influx of foreign capital through multinational 
enterprises is expected to bring in new technology which can dissipate to the local economy 
and hence boost productivity and growth at the firm and aggregate level. Many developing 
countries have opened up in order to attract FDI with some success (Agosin and Machado, 
2007). The policies of developing countries towards FDI may affect the type or form in 
addition to the level. This is the issue addressed here in respect of India. 
This paper contributes to the substantial literature on FDI in developing countries by 
studying empirically a (developed country’s) firm’s decision to locate in India. We focus on 
two aspects of this choice. First, we model empirically the determinants of the decision to 
invest in India, compared to a control group of similar firms that did not invest. Second, we 
investigate the choice of the level of ownership when setting up a foreign affiliate in India.  
At both levels, we pay particular attention to variables that broadly capture the level of 
technology  that  may  be  transferred  to  India.  Specifically,  these  are  productivity  in  the 
parent company and the knowledge intensity (measured as R&D intensity) of the industry 
in which the parent firm operates. We focus in our analysis also on the importance of FDI 
liberalisation.  India  relaxed  restrictions  on  FDI  starting  from  the  early  1990s  and  we 
investigate whether this had any measurable impact on the ‘quality’ of FDI as proxied by 
the two technology variables.   
The  research  questions  are  important  for  a  number  of  reasons.  First  of  all,  a 
government may be particularly interested in receiving high-tech investment in order to 




foreign ownership for the host country to appropriate a larger share of FDI-related rents 
(Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). Indeed, it has been shown that there are important differences 
in spillovers from majority and minority owned foreign affiliates of multinationals to the 
local economy (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). Javorcik 
and  Spatareanu  (2008)  in  a  panel  analysis  using  data  for  Romanian  firms,  find  that 
spillovers tend to be higher from partially owned affiliates of multinationals. However, 
selective  approval  procedures  and  ownership  restrictions  may  come  at  the  cost  of 
substantially reducing FDI inflows and limiting the overall potential of local spillovers. A 
foreign parent company may transfer state-of-the-art technology only to a wholly owned 
affiliate, rather than to a joint venture (JV), in order to prevent the leakage of technology to 
the  foreign  partner  (Ramachandran,  1993;  Desai  et  al.,  2004).  Hence,  the  decision  on 
investing  and  the  ownership  share  may  ultimately  have  profound  implications  for  the 
relationship between inward FDI and growth in the host economy.   
The literature on bargaining as well as transaction costs and incomplete contracts 
offers important theoretical building blocs to analyse FDI-related ownership issues.
1 The 
first approach typically posits that firms offering more valuable benefits to the host country 
improve their bargaining position and, thus, tend to have higher ownership shares. On the 
other hand, foreign ownership tends to be lower when the host country is highly attractive 
to  FDI,  for  example  by  offering  large  local  markets.  The  transaction  cost  concept  of 
ownership choice takes into account that JVs with local partners may provide benefits to 
foreign investors relying on local assets and knowledge and, at the same time, give rise to 
costs if contracts are incomplete and free riding is difficult to prevent. 
Arguably, R&D represents an important element with respect to both FDI-related 
transaction  costs  and  bargaining.  Previous  literature  finds  that  firms  in  R&D  intensive 




prevent leakage of knowledge (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Javorcik, 2000).
2  Yet, it is from 
firms in these industries that we may expect the largest beneficial effects to emanate to the 
local economy. These are knowledge intensive industries which provide a large potential 
for learning by firms in developing countries.   
Apart from industry-level knowledge intensity, another indicator of the knowledge 
potential of a foreign investor is firm-level productivity. In this respect, Raff et al. (2009) 
present a theoretical model of the choice a multinational faces between opting for a JV with 
a local firm or a wholly owned greenfield investment. Their theoretical analysis shows that 
more  productive  firms  tend  to  choose  higher  ownership  shares  and  prefer  greenfield 
investment, as higher productivity (synonymous with higher level of assets in their model) 
reduces the costs of greenfield investment relative to a JV.  Their theoretical proposition is 
backed  up  with  empirical  results  using  data  on  ownership  choices  of  Japanese 
multinationals.   
Related  to  our  work,  several  studies  analyse  the  determinants  of  the  ownership 
structure  of  FDI  projects  by  employing  dichotomous  choice  models  on  wholly  owned 
subsidiaries versus JVs. Gomes-Casseres (1989) shows for some 1500 subsidiaries of about 
180 US-based MNEs that this binomial choice depends on the nature of each subsidiary’s 
business, in combination with industry and host-country characteristics.
3 The probability 
for a JV is lower, for instance, when the US parent is more experienced in the specific 
industry and more familiar with the host country, when the subsidiary is integrated into 
intra-MNE trade, and when the subsidiary operates in an R&D intensive industry that is 
part of the parent company’s core business. Likewise, Blomström and Zejan (1991) find 
that Swedish MNEs with less diversified product lines and more foreign experience opt 
against minority ownership.
4 Javorcik (2000) focuses on intra-industry differences in R&D 




eastern European transition countries. She finds that leading parent companies in terms of 
technology  and  marketing  prefer  wholly  owned  subsidiaries,  though  not  in  low-tech 
industries. 
Asiedu  and  Esfahani  (2001)  go  beyond  the  dichotomy  between  wholly  owned 
subsidiaries  and  JVs  and  treat  the  foreign  equity  share  as  a  continuous  variable.  Note 
however that JVs account for only 14 per cent of their sample of about 2400 subsidiaries of 
US-based MNEs. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) complement firm characteristics by industry- 
and host country-related determinants of foreign equity shares, as we do in the following 
analysis. Firm characteristics include proxies of the parent firms’ assets and more widely 
used variables such as firm size, production diversity and international experience. Most 
firm characteristics impact significantly on the equity share, with the notable exception of 
firm size. 
In order to investigate  empirically the importance of  firm-level productivity and 
industry-level knowledge intensity for the choice of ownership share we combine two firm-
specific datasets on German companies engaged in India as foreign direct investors. The 
case of German FDI in India is expected to offer relevant insights. Germany is one of the 
most important home countries for FDI,
5 and plays an important role in India’s efforts to 
attract FDI and, thereby, promote the process of economic catching up. At the same time, 
India may be second only to China when it comes to concerns about offshoring in the home 
countries of MNEs. Furthermore, the  Indian example is expected to provide interesting 
lessons as to how firm decisions were affected by less selective approval procedures and 
relaxed ownership restrictions since the early 1990s.     
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the firm-specific data 
used. We employ two-step Heckman models to assess the impact of firm, industry and 




differences between the selection and the ownership share equation, and also between the 
pre-reform and post-reform periods. As argued in section 4, the evidence has important 
policy implications and clearly reveals the trade-offs involved in selective FDI approvals 
and foreign ownership restrictions.  
 
 
2.  Data Issues  
To assess the determinants of German company decisions on engaging in India we draw on 
the detailed information compiled by the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce for almost 
800 so-called financial and technical collaborations of German firms with Indian partners 
(IGCC, 2003). This directory covers subsidiaries of German firms in India, JVs with Indian 
firms  and  other  collaborations  involving  the  production  of  goods  and  services.  The 
snapshot presented in this source relates to the situation as of 2003. The dataset includes 
JVs that do not fall under the usual FDI definition of involving a minimum of 10 per cent of 
foreign  equity  participation.  Purely  technical  collaboration  (that  is,  license)  agreements 
without any financial engagement of the German firm are also listed but are not used in this 
paper as they do not involve ownership.   
It  is  in  several  respects  that  IGCC  (2003)  offers  a  particularly  rich  database. 
Information related to the type and intensity of the German firms’ engagement include: the 
type of collaboration (financial or purely technical), the year when the collaboration started 
as well as the founding year of the Indian partner firm, the capital stock of the German 
subsidiary  or  Indo-German  JV,  the  German  share  in  paid  up  capital,  annual  sales,  and 
employment.  In  addition,  it  is  clearly  identified  where  exactly  in  India  the  German 




the manufacturing sector, accounting for 80-90 per cent of total FDI, while the German 
engagement in the services sector remained marginal until 2003.
6 
It is important to note that the unit of observation in IGCC (2003) is the subsidiary 
or JV, rather than the German parent or partner company.
7 Some German companies are 
actually  involved  in  several  FDI  projects;  prominent  examples  include  major  German 
companies and conglomerates such as Daimler AG, Osram GmbH, Epcos AG, Allianz SE, 
and Siemens AG. Large FDI projects are the exception. Three quarters of German FDI 
projects involve subsidiaries or JVs with less than Rs. 60 million of paid up capital in 2003 
(slightly more than €1 million at 2003 exchange rates); median employment is slightly 
below 50 workers and median German equity share is slightly above 50 per cent. Minority 
shares of up to 25 per cent are clearly the exception (about 10 per cent of all available 
observations),  while  almost  a  third  of  all  FDI  projects  are  wholly  German  owned 
subsidiaries. Financial collaboration typically started in the mid-1990s after FDI regulations 
were relaxed in the course of India’s economic reform programme of 1991 (CUTS, 2003).  
In order to obtain more information on the German firms engaged in  India, we 
combine  IGCC  (2003)  with  company  profiles  available  from  the  online  database  of 
Hoppenstedt,  a  commercial  data  provider  (http://www.hoppenstedt-
hochschuldatenbank.de).  This  source  covers  all  German  companies  with  more  than  20 
employees or annual sales of more than €1 million, including most of the parent firms with 
engagements in India. We use information on the German parent relating to: (major and 
minor) line(s) of business with NACE industry code(s) (version 1.1), year of foundation, 
annual sales, number of employees, and number of foreign affiliates. Employment and sales 
figures  for  many  companies  are  available  online  only  for  the  most  recent  years;  to 




we refer to earlier hardcopies of Hoppenstedt (2004a, b) for data on employment and sales 
in, preferably, 2002 (or the closest year available).
8 
Hoppenstedt’s  company  profiles  are  also  used  to  collect  the  same  set  of  firm-
specific data for a control group of German companies that had not undertaken FDI in India 
until 2003. The control group is constructed in a way that its overall size as well as its 
industry structure resembles the size and industry structure of the sample of German FDI 
cases underlying the subsequent estimations. The selection of companies for the control 
group is random. We draw the required number ni of companies for each industry i by 
dividing  the  (alphabetically  ordered)  list  of  Hoppenstedt  profiles  for  all  companies  in 
industry  i  into  n+1  subgroups,  and  drawing  the  company  at  the  dividing  line  of  two 
neighbouring subgroups for the control group. 
The  firm-specific  datasets  are  complemented  by  two  sets  of  variables.  First,  we 
consider some important characteristics of the industry in Germany to which the parent 
firm belongs.
9 We focus on the R&D intensity of the German industry. On the one hand, 
developing host countries are typically eager to attract advanced technologies that foreign 
investors in R&D intensive industries are most likely to possess. On the other hand, firms 
in  R&D  intensive  industries  tend  to  prefer  full  ownership  to  prevent  leakage  of 
technological knowledge (Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Javorcik, 2000).
10 Second, we consider 
state characteristics that may have a say on a state’s attractiveness to FDI and which may 
also be relevant for a firm’s choice of ownership share in the foreign affiliate. Our focus 
here is on openness measures at the state level. In this way, we account for the fact that 
India’s economic reform programme of 1991 has reduced central government control so 
that policies and institutions at the state level are supposed to matter increasingly in the 




The online appendix presents some more details on the database construction, as 
well as exact definitions of all variables. A more detailed presentation of stylised facts on 
German FDI projects in India is available in Görg et al. (2008). 
  
 
3.   Methodology and Results 
In our empirical analysis we model the investment decision of German firms in India as a 
two-step problem. First, firms decide whether or not to invest in India. We model this as a 
zero/one decision depending on firm (i) and industry (j) characteristics,  
 
Pr(FDIi) = β1 Xi + β2 R&Dj + β3 K/Lj + ei      (1) 
 
This model is estimated using data for the German investors as well as the control group as 
defined in the previous section. For those firms that do invest in India, we can then also 
model the choice of ownership share,  
 
  oshi = α1 Xi + α2 R&Dj + λi + vi      (2) 
 
where osh is the ownership share chosen by firm i.  
This model is estimated using the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. In equation 
(2), Xi denotes a vector of firm characteristics, and R&Dj is the industry’s R&D expenditure 
relative to sales. The parameter λi captures the probability of firm i being observed in this 
second step (inverted Mills ratio in Heckman’s parlance) and vi is the remaining error term.  
Equation (1) includes the same set of variables in the selection equation as well as one 




of  investing  abroad,  which  are  assumed  to  affect  the  selection  but  not  the  choice  of 
ownership. As a proxy for this we use the capital intensity (K/Lj) of the industry of the 
parent company.
11   
Vector Xi includes size (measured in terms of employment), productivity (measured 
as labour productivity), age, the number of industries in which the firm is active (as a 
measure of diversification at the firm level), and number of existing foreign affiliates (as a 
measure of experience in foreign markets).   
Productivity is included as this is highlighted in theoretical and empirical work by 
Raff et al (2009). In their empirical specification they also control for firm size and age in 
order  to  capture  observable  aspects  of  firm  heterogeneity  that  may  be  correlated  with 
productivity. We also add a variable capturing the number of industries in which a parent 
firm  is  operating  to  proxy  the  level  of  diversification  of  the  parent.  Previous  papers 
hypothesise  that  more  diversified  parents  are  less  likely  to  engage  in  full  ownership, 
although  the  empirical  evidence  in  support  of  this  hypothesis  is  weak  (Meyer,  1998; 
Javorcik, 2000). Arguably, the level of experience abroad may also have implications for 
the probability of investing in another foreign country as well as the choice of ownership. If 
they invest at all, firms with no experience may have to cooperate with foreign partners 
who know about the foreign environment. By contrast, firms with large experience abroad 
may not have to rely on foreign partners but are familiar with overseas operations and can 
therefore  choose  to  go  on  their  own.  This  implies  that  we  would  expect  a  positive 
correlation  between  the  number  of  foreign  affiliates  a  firm  has,  and  its  presence  as  an 
investor in India and its choice of ownership share (see also Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; 
Blomström and Zejan, 1991). 
Note that we interpret statistically significant coefficients as indicating correlations 




possible  endogeneity.  This  may  be  a  problem  for  the  firm-level  variables  included,  in 
particular productivity and size, as these may be jointly determined with the ownership 
share, and/or the decision to invest in India. Given the cross-section nature of our data it is 
difficult to come up with convincing instruments that would allow us to control adequately 
for this possible endogeneity. However, there is little reason to be concerned about reverse 
causality running from German FDI in India to parent firm characteristics. As we noted 
before,  most  German  FDI  projects  are  fairly  small,  involving  less  than  €1  million  of 
invested capital and no more than 50 local workers. Still, in order to mitigate the problem, 
we follow Raff et al. (2009) and lag firm size and productivity in equations (1) and (2).  
Table  1  presents  the  estimations  of  the  baseline  model.  Column  (1)  shows  the 
selection  equation,  column  (2)  the  ownership  share  equation.  In  terms  of  the  control 
variables  we  find  that  firm  size,  age,  number  of  foreign  affiliates  and  degree  of 
diversification are statistically significantly correlated with the decision to invest in India 
(selection equation). Also, the measure of sunk costs matters for selection, as hypothesised 
we find that firms in industries with higher sunk costs (capital to labour ratio) are less likely 
to  invest  in  India.  For  the  choice  of  ownership  share,  only  firm  age  and  degree  of 
diversification are statistically significant, and their signs are opposite to those found in the 
selection equation.   
Discussion focuses on the two main variables of interest, firm-level productivity and 
industry-level technology (R&D intensity), which reveal remarkable differences between 
the selection and the ownership share equation. In terms of selection, it is apparent that 
more productive firms are associated with being more likely to invest in India. This mirrors 
the result that more productive firms invest abroad which is common in the literature (for 
example,  Helpman  et  al.,  2004;  Geishecker  et  al.,  2009).  We  also  find  that  firms  that 




in India. Hence, German investment in India is likely to be from low research intensive 
industries, but it is by highly productive firms within a given industry. The focus on lower-
tech industries tends to be in some conflict with the preferences of host countries such as 
India, but may reflect that firms choose more advanced locations for investing in high-tech 
lines of business.  
In the ownership share equation we find that results are in some sense opposite.  
Firm-level productivity is no longer statistically significant, but we find that the research 
intensity  of  the  industry  is  positively  associated  with  ownership  share.  In  other  words, 
among the firms that invest in India, firms choose a higher ownership share the higher is 
the  research  intensity  (or  knowledge  stock)  of  the  industry.  This  is  in  line  with  the 
theoretical proposition that firms in industries using higher levels of technology attempt to 
prevent dissipation of that knowledge through opting for whole or majority owned affiliates 
rather than JVs with foreign partners holding the majority of shares.  
In  order  to  check  the  robustness  of  the  second-stage  result  to  the  choice  of 
estimation technique we also estimate equation (2) using a Tobit estimator. This alternative 
is appropriate as it allows for the censored nature of the data. Results presented in column 
(3)  are  similar  to  those  reported  before.  Firm-level  productivity  is  not  statistically 
significantly associated with ownership share, while higher industry-level research intensity 
implies  a  higher  ownership  share.  In  what  follows,  we  concentrate  on  the  Heckman 
estimation, as this also allows us to model the first-step decision.   
[Table 1 here] 
In order to look at our analysis from a more policy relevant angle, we make use of 
India’s move towards liberalising its FDI regulations starting in 1991 (CUTS, 2003; FICCI, 
2005). Amongst other things, this also included easing restrictions on the operations of 




‘The  1991  reforms  marked  a  major  break  from  the  earlier  dirigiste  regime  with  its 
regulation of the spheres of foreign affiliate participation and its modes of operation.’ Of 
course, this deregulation may have had implications for the choice to invest in India and, 
indeed,  for  the  choice  of  ownership  share  by  foreign  parents.  In  particular,  given  that 
restrictions  on  the  level  of  ownership  by  foreign  firms  were  in  place  and  that  more 
technology intensive projects were favoured by the regulator, the choice before 1991 may 
not reflect economic optimisation but only the effect of such regulation.   
In order to investigate this we split our sample into those firms that invested before 
and after 1991.
12 In the estimation of the selection equation (1) we include the full control 
group as counterparts for these two samples. The results are reported in columns (1) to (4) 
of Table 2. Note that the baseline results reported in Table 1 also adequately describe the 
choice of investment and ownership share for investments by German firms after 1991 
(columns 3 and 4). For investments before 1991, which is under the regulation regime, 
results differ. In that case, the probability of investing in India is positively associated with 
firm-level productivity as well as the research intensity of the industry. This is likely to 
reflect the aim of the regulation, namely, to attract investments in high-tech industries. The 
choice  of  ownership  share,  however,  is  independent  of  firm  productivity  or  industry 
research intensity.  In other words, for those firms that were allowed to invest in India, 
knowledge intensity at the industry, or productivity at the firm level, do not affect their 
choice of ownership share. This seems to suggest that selective FDI approval procedures, 
together with foreign ownership restrictions, have helped India to attract the desired form of 
FDI from German investors – an issue to which we return in section 4. 
[Table 2 here] 
Liberalisation of the investment regime made the country more open to trade and 




ownership share differs depending on the degree of openness of the Indian state in which 
the investment is located. We use two alternative measures of openness; openness I relates 
to the state-level distribution of investments in so-called 100% export-oriented units (EOU) 
in  1991-2001,  relative  to  the  respective  state’s  share  in  India’s  population  (Observer 
Research Foundation, 2004). The EOU scheme was introduced in the 1980s to promote 
Indian  exports.
13  More  open  states  have  higher  values  of  openness  I.  An  alternative 
measure, openness II, comes from Marjit et al. (2007) who classify 15 major Indian states 
(covering 82 per cent of our sample of German FDI cases) as relatively open or closed. The 
index ranges from 1 (most open) to 15 (least open) and is based on a systematic assessment 
of  production  structures  at  the  state  level.  States  are  considered  relatively  open  when 
production  structures  correspond  relatively  well  with  India’s  revealed  comparative 
advantages  in  international  trade.  Based  on  these  two  alternative  measures,  we  classify 
states as open if openness measure I (II) is above (below) the median, otherwise states are 
considered closed.  
The results are reported in Table 3. In general, these results are in line with our 
previous  results.  In  more  open  states  (as  in  the  post-liberalisation  period),  investment 
decision  and  ownership  share  choice  are  determined  by  firm-level  productivity  and 
industry-level R&D intensity. In particular, less productive firms, and firms in more R&D 
intensive industries are less likely to invest in open states, while, for firms that invested 
there, those in R&D intensive industries tend to opt for higher ownership shares, arguably 
in order to protect their knowledge from dissipating into the local economy. In less open 
states  (or  in  the  pre-liberalisation  period)  firm  and  industry  characteristics  are  less 
important determinants of investment and ownership share choice.   




Finally, we attempt to distinguish between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ German FDI 
projects in India in order to assess whether the type of FDI matters for the role of firm and 
industry characteristics. Note that theoretical models such as Raff et al. (2009) focus on 
horizontal  FDI.  It  is  thus  open  to  question  whether  the  type  of  FDI  matters  for  the 
robustness of coefficients estimated for the full sample. As mentioned in the introduction, 
FDI involving state-of-the-art technology improves the bargaining position of foreign firms 
so that foreign ownership tends to increase with R&D intensity. However, this link may 
weaken if foreign investors are mainly interested in penetrating large local markets, shifting 
the relative bargaining position towards the government. According to Desai et al. (2004), 
foreign ownership is likely to be higher for vertical FDI; in this way, firms coordinating 
integrated production activities across different locations may mitigate conflicts with local 
partners pursuing competing goals. Likewise, Hennart (1991: 486) argues that ‘conflicts 
between joint venture partners can be expected to arise … when foreign subsidiaries export 
back to the parent’s home market or to third markets.’ 
The distinction between vertical and horizontal FDI is bound to be tentative. We 
draw on bilateral exports and imports, as reported by the OECD in its International Trade 
by  Commodities  database,
14  assuming  that  German  FDI  in  India  is  more  likely  to  be 
vertical (horizontal) in industries for which Indian-German trade relations – notably Indian 
exports to Germany – are stronger (weaker).
15 This is obviously an imperfect indicator of 
vertical and horizontal FDI, but arguably informative as vertical FDI leads to trade between 
host  and  home  country  (Markusen,  2002).  One  striking  difference  in  results  between 
vertical and horizontal investments is that for the former, industry-level R&D intensity and 
firm size are positively correlated with the choice of ownership share. This is not the case 
for  horizontal  investments.  This  appears  to  be  in  line  with  the  bargaining  argument 




economy and, thus, firms may be in a better bargaining position and be able to choose to 
have higher ownership shares.  
[Table 4 here] 
 
4.  Policy Implications 
There are essentially two approaches of drawing on inward FDI in order to boost firm 
productivity and economic growth and India at times has employed both; on Indian reform 
and FDI, see Balasubramanyam and Mahambare (2003), as well as Singh and Srinivasan 
(2006).  India  adopted  the  first  approach  prior  to  its  reform  programme  in  1991  by 
selectively  targeting  FDI  inflows  and  strictly  regulating  foreign  ownership  shares. 
Policymakers aimed at attracting high-tech, R&D intensive FDI projects and luring foreign 
investors who readily accepted Indian JV partners. R&D intensive FDI was supposed to 
offer the best way to receive state-of-the-art technology, and JVs were deemed necessary 
for the Indian partners to learn from foreign investors and imitate superior technological 
processes,  product  design  and  management  procedures.  India  shifted  to  the  second 
approach  in  the  course  of  economic  reforms  starting  in  the  early  1990s,  including  the 
gradual  dismantling  of  FDI  regulations.  By  opening  up  less  R&D  intensive  lines  of 
business to FDI and relaxing foreign ownership restrictions the country provided rather 
indirect  incentives  for  foreign  investor  to  transfer  state-of-the-art  technology.
16 
Policymakers  increasingly  let  foreign  investors  decide  on  the  type  of  FDI  projects  and 
ownership shares. In particular, India increasingly accepted that foreign investors tend to 
prefer retaining ownership control over superior technologies they possess.  
Our empirical results clearly reflect the different approaches in the pre- and post-
reform era. The observation of R&D intensity positively affecting the selection of German 




deliberate choices of German investors, but rather to FDI regulations in line with local 
policymakers’ preferences. The same applies to R&D intensity not having had a significant 
impact on the German ownership share in the pre-reform period and in closed Indian states. 
The preferences of German investors came to the fore when and where foreign companies 
were  allowed  to  choose.  Less  R&D  intensive  FDI  projects  were  more  likely  to  be 
undertaken in the post-reform era and in more open Indian states. Furthermore, investors 
undertaking R&D intensive FDI projects clearly preferred higher ownership shares when 
having the freedom of choice. 
One may be tempted to conclude at this point that policymakers interested in high-
tech FDI inflows with local partners being involved in JVs have good reasons to enforce 
their preferences on foreign investors through selective approval procedures and foreign 
ownership  restrictions.  Such  a  conclusion  would  miss  an  important  point,  however. 
Constraining the choices of foreign investors comes at a cost. The inspection of our sample 
of German investments, in combination with the previously reported results, suggests that 
policymakers  face  a  serious  trade-off.  The  regulatory  pre-reform  approach  ensures  that 
realised FDI projects correspond to the host country’s preferences with respect to firm and 
industry characteristics as well as ownership structure. At the same time, this approach 
tends  to  reduce  the  number  of  realised  FDI  projects.  Importantly,  regulations  may 
discourage  the  number  of  preferred  projects  as  much  as  projects  that  are  discouraged 
deliberately. In other words, when assessing the policy implications of the pre- and post-
reform  approaches  it  has  to  be  taken  into  account  whether  (possibly  undesired)  reform 
effects  on  the  structure  of  FDI  in  India  were  compensated  by  positive  effects  on  the 





Table 5 substantiates this point by classifying the (counts of) FDI projects in our 
sample according to the R&D intensity of the industry to which the investor belongs in 
Germany,  the  timing  of  FDI  projects  and  their  location  in  different  Indian  states.  Not 
surprisingly, the overall number of FDI projects soared in the post-reform period – by a 
factor of 4.5 when comparing 1992-2003 with 1981-1991.
17 The deregulation of low-tech 
projects accounts for a substantial proportion of the increase in the overall number of FDI 
projects, but the number of higher-tech projects also multiplied.
18 Indeed, projects in the 
high R&D category still outnumbered projects in the low R&D category after the latter 
were liberalised. Put differently, the highly selective pre-reform approach had not only the 
desired  effect  of  discouraging  low-tech  projects,  but  also  appears  to  have  substantially 
reduced the number of preferred projects. 
The table also portrays the experience of two groups of selected Indian states. The 
four states rated ‘more open’ accounted for 42 per cent of 100% EOU in India in 1991-
2001 (Observer Research Foundation, 2004), while their population share was only 26 per 
cent. Moreover, Marjit et al. (2007) classified all four states as more open than the group of 
five ‘closed’ states. Various authors, including Singh and Srinivasan (2006) and Kochhar et 
al. (2006), have stressed that policies and institutions at the state level matter increasingly 
since the early 1990s, with economic reforms having reduced central government control 
and  having  increased  the  potential  for  greater  disparities  across  states.  Indeed,  the  five 
closed  states,  accounting  for  37  per  cent  of  India’s  population,  hosted  very  few  FDI 
projects. This applies to all R&D categories in both the pre- and post-reform period. By 
contrast, the effects of opening-up to world markets on the structure as well as the overall 
frequency of FDI are evident for the four more open states. The share of low-tech FDI 
projects clearly increased in these states in the post-reform period (to about one quarter). 




the group of more open states to almost the same extent. Specifically, more open states did 
not lose relative attractiveness for high-tech FDI projects, compared to states that remained 
less open. 
The distribution of vertical FDI, that is, cases where India’s export pattern pointed 
to a relatively strong integration into intra-industry trade with Germany, reveals another 
trade-off policymakers are facing when pursuing selective FDI regulations in order to direct 
foreign  investors  into  high-tech  projects.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  5,  vertical  FDI 
accounted for two thirds of the increase in the overall number of German FDI projects, 
comparing  the  post-reform  period  with  the  pre-reform  period.  It  was  particularly  in 
industries  with  low  R&D  intensity  that  vertical  FDI  appears  to  have  received  a  boost 
through  the  reform  programme.  This  suggests  that  insisting  on  high-tech  FDI  has  the 
undesired  side-effect  of  discouraging  export-oriented  FDI,  a  type  of  FDI  which 
policymakers in developing host countries are typically also fond of receiving. 
Finally, the bottom part of Table 5 underscores the reform effects on the ownership 
structure of German FDI projects in India. Full German ownership was a rare exception in 
the  pre-reform  era,  while  accounting  for  almost  40  per  cent  of  post-reform  projects. 
Policymakers may consider an absolute decline in the number of FDI projects with foreign 
minority shares, thereby impairing the chances of local JV partners to learn from foreign 
investors and imitate their superior technology, as a cost of reform arising from giving 
foreign  investors  choice  of  ownership.  However,  policymakers  must  weigh  this  decline 
against  the  number  of  FDI  projects  with  full  or  majority  foreign  ownership  that  were 
arguably  made  possible  only  by  the  reforms.  For  instance,  comparing  the  post-reform 
period with the pre-reform period in the high R&D category, the decline in the number of 
cases with minority ownership was overcompensated five times by additional projects with 




government’s  preferences  on  foreign  investors  might  come  at  a  considerable  cost,  by 
impairing the incentives of foreign investors to undertake FDI that has at least some of the 
desired characteristics. 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
We find both firm and industry characteristics related to technology intensity to be relevant 
when MNEs decide on (i) whether or not to engage with FDI in a host country and (ii) the 
share of ownership in foreign affiliates. We estimate Heckman models by drawing on two 
largely unnoticed datasets on German MNEs with varying equity stakes in Indian affiliates 
and  a  control  group  without  any  FDI  in  India.  In  contrast  to  most  previous  studies 
employing dichotomous choice models on wholly owned subsidiaries versus joint ventures, 
the data used in the present study allows treating the German MNEs’ equity shares as a 
continuous variable. Furthermore, we explicitly account for the effects of India’s opening 
up to world markets in the early 1990s on MNEs’ FDI and ownership decisions. 
It  turns  out  that  more  productive  German  firms  are  generally  more  likely  to 
undertake  FDI  in  India,  while  firm  productivity  hardly  matters  for  foreign  ownership 
shares. More strikingly, India’s reforms clearly affected the role of industry-specific R&D 
intensity  in  the  two-stage  decision  process  of  German  MNEs.  During  the  post-reform 
period, FDI projects in R&D intensive industries were less likely and FDI projects in such 
industries  were  associated  with  higher  German  equity  shares.  By  contrast,  the  limited 
number of pre-reform FDI projects was mainly R&D intensive and minority owned. 
Obviously, the bilateral Indo-German setting of the present paper cautions against 




based elsewhere. The motivations underlying FDI in India may differ from those of FDI in 
smaller developing countries. Ideally, one might aim at panel analyses covering various 
host countries and revealing more than just a snapshot of one particular year. However, 
such data are at present not available. 
Keeping  these  caveats  in  mind,  the  present  study  offers  interesting  policy 
conclusions, notably on the trade-offs policymakers are facing when trying to lure FDI of a 
preferred  type.  Selective  FDI  approval  procedures,  together  with  foreign  ownership 
restrictions, seem to have helped pre-reform India to attract the desired form of FDI - high-
tech projects with foreign minority shares, enabling local joint venture partners to benefit 
from project-specific spillovers. Nevertheless, host-country governments aiming at growth 
and productivity enhancing FDI may be well advised to relax foreign ownership restrictions 
and open up lower-tech industries to FDI, as India has done since the early 1990s. Strict 
regulations  ensuring  that  still  realised  FDI  projects  correspond  to  the  host  country’s 
preferences may substantially reduce the number of realised projects – including those with 




                                                            
1 For informative accounts of the relevant literature, see Hennart (1991), Nakamura and Xie (1998), Asiedu 
and Esfahani (2001), and Desai et al. (2004). 
2 However, these studies generally proxy industry characteristics using data for the host country, while we use 
information on the home country industry. Arguably, the characteristics of the home country industry are a 
better indicator of the technology level used in the industry than those of the host country.   
3 Gatignon and Anderson (1988) draw on the same database, the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project 
covering the entry modes of US-based MNEs in 1960-1975. In contrast to Gomes-Casseres (1989), these 
authors consider the continuum of foreign ownership (5-100 per cent equity). They find, among others, that 
MNEs with more experience abroad opt for wholly owned subsidiaries; R&D intensity positively affects the 
first-stage decision to aim at full ownership, while varying degrees of JV partnership are viewed as equivalent 
in the second stage once full ownership is ruled out. 
4 Blomström and Zejan (1991) address the dichotomy between minority and majority ownership, rather than 
that of wholly owned subsidiaries versus JVs. 
5 It is only the United States and the United Kingdom whose outward FDI stocks clearly exceeded Germany’s 
outward FDI stocks in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007). 
6 The German engagement is also concentrated within manufacturing. Mechanical engineering, chemicals, 
and metal products figure most prominently in terms of the number of FDI projects. 
7 The same applies to the data used by Raff et al. (2007). 
8 While the matching is improved by drawing on Hoppenstedt (2004a; b), this comes at the cost of losing 
some observations on German parent firms. The reason is that employment and sales thresholds are somewhat 
higher (35 employees or annual sales of more than € 3.5 million), compared to the online database. 
9 Most industry characteristics can be calculated at the 4-digit NACE level. An important exception is R&D 
intensity which is reported only at the 2-digit level (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002a). Note that the German 
Warenverzeichnis (WZ 2003) corresponds with NACE revision 1.1. 
10 Ideally, one would of course refer to R&D intensity at the firm level. However, these data are generally not 
available; see Marin et al. (2003) for related survey data on German FDI projects in eastern Europe. 
11 This follows the recent literature on firm heterogeneity, sunk costs and foreign investment, such as 
Helpman et al. (2004).  Note that, strictly speaking, identification of the two-step estimation does not hinge on 
this additional variable.  If there were no additional variable in the first step, identification would be solely on 
the different functional form of the two equations.  We also experimented with including K/L in the second 
step, but the variable always turned out to be statistically insignificant. This strengthens our assumption that it 
should be excluded from the choice of ownership share equation.   
12 In the online appendix we provide the Tobit equivalent of the model in Table 2, which shows that results 
obtained using that estimator are similar in nature, especially with regard to the productivity and R&D 
variables.  We also report in that appendix results that use 1995 rather than 1991 as cut-off, taking account of 
the fact that the reform programme of 1991 marked just the first steps towards the deregulation of FDI. This 
does not change the results substantially.    
13 See http://www.mumbaicustoms.gov.in/scripts/eou.asp for details on the EOU scheme. 
14 The data are available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34235_1906706_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed: April 
2009). 
15 More precisely, we consider Indian exports to Germany over German exports to India in 2002 in SITC 
categories that correspond to the NACE codes for which our sample contains German FDI cases. The 
matching of SITC and NACE codes is mostly at the 3-digit NACE level. 
16 Perhaps there was increasing awareness that technology can be transferred in other ways. Parameswaran 
(2009) finds that technology spillovers associated with trade have contributed to increasing manufacturing 
productivity. 
17 Note that the pre-reform period covered in the table goes back to the 1950s. 
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Table 1: Baseline estimation results 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Heckman  Heckman  Tobit 
  Selection  Ownership share  Ownership share 
Firm variables       
       
ln(productivity)  0.806  -0.008  0.060 
  (0.296)***  (0.110)  (0.136) 
ln(size)  0.515  0.021  0.076 
  (0.055)***  (0.032)  (0.028)*** 
age  0.137  -0.065  -0.075 
  (0.072)*  (0.031)**  (0.042)* 
diversification  -0.689  0.226  0.199 
  (0.243)***  (0.093)**  (0.123) 
# affiliates  0.419  -0.018  0.026 
  (0.106)***  (0.044)  (0.050) 
       
Industry variables       
       
ln(R&D)  -4.072  1.007  0.904 
  (0.646)***  (0.305)***  (0.381)** 
ln(K/L)  -1.277     
  (0.329)***     
Observations  508    271 
Wald test (p-value)  0.000     
Mills ratio (p-value)  0.267     
R-squared      0.09 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 







Table 2: Results for pre- and post-liberalisation investments 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Pre 1991  Pre 1991  Post 1991  Post 1991 
  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman 
  Selection  Ownership share  Selection  Ownership share 
Firm variables         
         
ln(productivity)  0.749  -0.029  0.800  0.118 
  (0.318)**  (0.180)  (0.360)**  (0.176) 
ln(size)  0.538  -0.010  0.484  0.025 
  (0.084)***  (0.078)  (0.058)***  (0.035) 
age  0.058  0.027  0.144  -0.072 
  (0.113)  (0.074)  (0.075)*  (0.030)** 
diversification  -0.832  0.632  -0.608  0.061 
  (0.361)**  (0.187)***  (0.255)**  (0.096) 
# affiliates  0.379  -0.148  0.448  -0.013 
  (0.144)***  (0.085)*  (0.115)***  (0.049) 
         
Industry variables         
         
ln(R&D)  2.699  -0.054  -4.076  1.045 
  (0.767)***  (0.473)  (0.617)***  (0.278)*** 
ln(K/L)  1.019    -1.240   
  (0.313)***    (0.316)***   
Observations  314    435   
uncensored obs  77    198   
Wald test (p-value)  0.000    0.000   
Mills ratio (p-value)  0.478    0.056   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include two digit industry dummies. 
 Table 3: Robustness checks: liberalisation and openness 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
























  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman 
  Selection  Ownership 
share 
Selection  Ownership 
share 
Selection  Ownership 
share 
Selection  Ownership 
share 
Firm variables                 
                 
ln(productivity)  0.074  -0.116  0.887  -0.041  0.876  0.179  0.679  -0.116 
  (0.679)  (1.074)  (0.331)***  (0.124)  (0.369)**  (0.206)  (0.326)**  (0.146) 
ln(size)  0.554  -0.009  0.481  0.003  0.541  0.114  0.464  -0.035 
  (0.080)***  (0.111)  (0.061)***  (0.039)  (0.070)***  (0.062)*  (0.065)***  (0.048) 
age  0.099  -0.044  0.152  -0.082  0.018  -0.113  0.246  -0.064 
  (0.096)  (0.055)  (0.082)*  (0.040)**  (0.088)  (0.039)***  (0.088)***  (0.050) 
diversification  -0.679  0.313  -0.577  0.201  -0.720  0.126  -0.526  0.315 
  (0.328)**  (0.186)*  (0.265)**  (0.114)*  (0.303)**  (0.134)  (0.279)*  (0.137)** 
# affiliates  0.486  -0.069  0.424  -0.041  0.361  0.112  0.503  -0.124 
  (0.146)***  (0.110)  (0.116)***  (0.061)  (0.133)***  (0.066)*  (0.123)***  (0.073)* 
                 
Industry 
variables 
               
                 
ln(R&D)  1.098  0.189  -4.517  1.071  0.427  -0.366  -4.692  1.456 
  (0.942)  (0.379)  (0.669)***  (0.355)***  (0.431)  (0.289)  (0.821)***  (0.404)*** 
ln(K/L)  4.331    -2.521    3.518    -2.755   
  (0.480)***    (0.340)***    (0.226)***    (0.421)***   
Observations  325    420    358    314   
uncensored obs  88    183    121    77   
Wald test (p-
value) 
0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
Mills ratio (p-
value) 
0.360    0.243    0.426    0.478   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table 4: Results for vertical and horizontal FDI 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  vertical  vertical  horizontal  horizontal 
  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman  Heckman 
  Selection  Ownership share  Selection  Ownership share 
Firm variables         
         
ln(productivity)  0.614  0.082  1.587  -0.151 
  (0.307)**  (0.130)  (0.827)*  (0.276) 
ln(size)  0.479  0.083  0.585  -0.027 
  (0.090)***  (0.045)*  (0.078)***  (0.047) 
age  -0.001  -0.057  0.209  -0.071 
  (0.123)  (0.046)  (0.094)**  (0.044) 
diversification  -1.055  0.171  -0.508  0.237 
  (0.433)**  (0.139)  (0.311)  (0.134)* 
# affiliates  0.545  0.049  0.367  -0.042 
  (0.184)***  (0.081)  (0.137)***  (0.053) 
         
Industry variables         
         
ln(R&D)  -3.902  0.751  -3.359  0.133 
  (0.632)***  (0.355)**  (0.843)***  (0.289) 
ln(K/L)  -1.025    -1.053   
  (0.233)***    (0.338)***   
Observations  213    295   
uncensored obs  93    144   
Wald test (p-value)  0.000    0.000   
Mills ratio (p-value)  0.425    0.047   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Table 5 – German FDI cases (number) in pre- and post-reform India: Distribution 
across industries, states and ownership shares 
 
  All industries  High R&D intensity  Medium R&D intensity  Low R&D intensity 
  All Indian states 
Pre reform  77  35  35  7 
Post reform  194  68  76  50 
  Five closed states
a 
Pre reform  3  1  2  -- 
Post reform  4  --  2  2 
  Four more open states
b 
Pre reform  59  27  27  5 
Post reform  128  46  50  32 
  Vertical FDI
c 
Pre reform  46  22  18  6 
Post reform  122  50  35  37 
  Full German ownership 
Pre reform  6  3  2  1 
Post reform  76  27  32  17 
  German majority share
d 
Pre reform  29  16  12  1 
Post reform  97  33  37  27 
  German minority share
d 
Pre reform  42  16  21  5 
Post reform  21  8  7  6 
a Andra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh. – 
b Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu. – 
c 
Ratio of Indian exports to Germany over German exports in the same industry to India > 0.3.  – 
d Minority: less 





Online Appendix  
A – More detail on the database construction 
IGCC (2003) distinguishes between the location of headquarters and factory location 
of the firms in  India with German participation. Many headquarters are located in Delhi, 
Mumbai or Bangalore, while factories are located in other states. The factory location is of 
principal  interest,  notably  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  when  assessing  the  distribution  of 
production activities (Head and Mayer, 2004: 971). In various cases, however, there is no 
separate entry of factory location in the IGCC database. We then assume production to take 
place at the location of headquarters. We also use the headquarter location in cases for which 
the database lists several factory locations.  
 
Apart from stand-alone companies, the Hoppenstedt database presents employees and 
sales for (i) specific firms belonging to a company group or conglomerate (‘Konzern’) and (ii) 
the company group as a whole. We use company group data whenever applicable. Option (ii) 
is preferred since the decision to engage in India is highly likely to be taken at a higher 
company level. Moreover, option (i) would involve a downward bias for company size when 
minor  segments  of  the  conglomerate  provide  the  legal  base  for  foreign  affiliates,  while 






B - Definition and sources of variables 
Variable  Definition   Source 
German subsidiary or joint venture in India:   
osh  German share in paid up capital, per cent; 2003  IGCC (2003) 
age  Year of subsidiary or JV going into operation  IGCC (2003) 
     
Characteristics of German (parent) firm:   
size  Size of the (parent) company, measured by number of employees; in logs; 




productivity  Labour productivity of the (parent) company, proxied by sales per employee; 








diversification  Number of industries (4-digit NACE codes) in which the (parent) firm is 
active; proxy of degree of diversification 
Hoppenstedt 
(online) 
   
Industry characteristics in Germany:   





R&D  R&D intensity, measured by R&D expenses in per cent of gross production; 




   
Location characteristics in Indian states:   
openness I  State’s share in 100% export oriented units (EOU) in all India in 1991-2001, 





openness II  Index on regional openness to trade; ranking of states in terms of their 
exposure to trade, as defined in the source; range from 1 (most open) to 15 
(closed) 









C – Alternative estimations 
 
C1. Tobit results for estimations in Table 2 
 
Table A1: Results for pre- and post-liberalisation investments 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Pre 1991  Post 1991 
  Tobit  Tobit 
  Ownership share  Ownership share 
Firm variables     
     
ln(productivity)  0.050  0.298 
  (0.136)  (0.262) 
ln(size)  0.042  0.129 
  (0.039)  (0.032)*** 
age  0.040  -0.076 
  (0.074)  (0.044)* 
diversification  0.600  -0.057 
  (0.182)***  (0.139) 
# affiliates  -0.108  0.070 
  (0.069)  (0.056) 
     
Industry variables     
     
ln(R&D)  0.049  0.776 
  (0.477)  (0.350)** 
Observations  77  198 
R squared  0.22  0.14 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 






C2. Sensitivity of 1991 cut-off 
 
In the regression results in Table A2, we take  account of the fact that the reform 
programme  of  1991  marked  just  the  first  step  towards  the  deregulation  of  FDI,  with  a 
sequence  of  further  FDI  liberalisation  in  subsequent  years  (CUTS,  2003;  FICCI,  2005). 
Accordingly, we split the sample into those investing before and after 1995.  Results for firms 
investing after 1995 are identical to those we obtained in Table 2 for firms investing after 
1991. For investments before 1995, the only difference to corresponding columns (1) and (2) 
in Table 2 is that firms are more likely to invest in India if they are in industries with lower 
research intensities. However, this effect is much smaller than in the selection equation on 
investments by firms after 1995.  
Table A2: Using 1995 instead of 1991 as cut-off 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Pre 1995  Pre 1995  Post 1995  Post 1995 
  Selection  Ownership 
share 
Selection  Ownership 
share 
Firm variables         
         
ln(productivity)  0.895  -0.034  0.732  0.035 
  (0.369)**  (0.154)  (0.391)*  (0.198) 
ln(size)  0.517  -0.004  0.479  0.027 
  (0.072)***  (0.058)  (0.063)***  (0.035) 
age  0.164  -0.009  0.109  -0.100 
  (0.089)*  (0.050)  (0.085)  (0.033)*** 
diversification  -0.835  0.396  -0.542  0.048 
  (0.300)***  (0.145)***  (0.276)**  (0.100) 
# affiliates  0.389  -0.052  0.487  -0.022 
  (0.126)***  (0.070)  (0.123)***  (0.055) 
         
Industry variables         
         
ln(R&D)  -2.274  -0.175  -4.223  1.203 
  (0.573)***  (0.284)  (0.634)***  (0.298)*** 
ln(K/L)  -13.076    -1.224   
  0.275)***    (0.325)***   
Observations  361    397   
uncensored obs  124    160   
Wald test (p-value)  0.000    0.000   
Mills ratio (p-value)  0.435    0.097   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include two digit industry dummies. 
 